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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
WITNESSES - PHYSICIAN DEFENDANT CALLED UNDER
ADVERSE-WITNESS STATUTE - EXPERT TESTIMONY
Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d
375 (1965).
One of the major burdens placed upon a plaintiff in a mal-
practice suit is that of obtaining expert medical testimony.' Such
testimony is essential if the alleged medical negligence is beyond the
comprehension of a layman, since the failure to produce a medical
expert under these circumstances can result in a directed verdict for
the defendant-physician.2 Since the procurement of medical experts
can be a difficult task, many plaintiffs' attorneys have attempted to
question the defendant-physician as an expert when called pursuant
to an adverse-witness statute. Although the typical adverse-witness
statute permits a litigant to examine an adverse party as an ordinary
witness subject to the rules of cross-examination, the state courts
have split on the question of whether a defendant-physician, called
pursuant to an adverse-witness statute, may be asked questions re-
quiring expert opinion.4 In the subject case of Oleksiw v. Wei-
' Melvin Belli has pointed out that this inability to obtain medical testimony is one
of the major problems in a malpractice suit. Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied:
The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REv. 250 (1950). A survey made by the
Boston University Law-Medicine Research Institute, and reported in Medical Economics,
Aug. 28, 1961, revealed that out of 214 doctors, only 31% of the specialists and 27%o
of the general practitioners said they would be willing to testify for the plaintiff if a sur-
geon, operating on a diseased kidney removed the wrong one. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 167 (3d ed. 1964).
2 See Morris, The Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of Negligence Issues, 26
TExAS L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1947).
3 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.07, which provides in part: "At the instance
of the adverse party, a party may be examined as if under cross-examination, orally, by
way of deposition, like any other witness .... The party calling for such examination
shall not thereby be concluded but may rebut it by evidence." See also: CAL. CODE
Civ. PRO. § 2055; GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1801 (1954); IDAHO CODE ANN. 9-1206
(Supp. 1963); KAN. CIV. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-243(b) (Vernon 1963); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 35, § 9 (1957); MASS. LAwS ANN. ch. 233, § 22 (1956); MIcH. STAr.
ANN. § 27.915 (1938); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.03 (Supp. 1964); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:81-11 (1951); WIs. STAT. § 325.14 (1961).
4 See, e.g., Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944); Libby v. Con-
way, 192 Cal. App. 2d 865, 13 Cal. Rep. 830 (1961); Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158,
132 Pac. 967 (1913); State v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 167 A.2d 117 (1961); Hull v.
Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944); McDermott v. Manhattan
Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964); Hunder v. Rindlaub,
61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931); Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207
N.E.2d 375 (1965). See also Annot. 88 A.L.R.2d 1186 (1963).
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dener,0 the Ohio Supreme Court answered this question in the af-
firmative.
In Oleksiw, the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against
two physicians, alleging that their negligence in performing a bi-
lateral, femoral arteriogram necessitated skin graft operations.
Plaintiff had no expert witness to testify in his behalf. However,
after calling one of the defendant-physicians to the stand pursuant
to Ohio's adverse-witness statute, plaintiff's counsel attempted to
elicit expert testimony from the physician. The trial court sus-
tained objections to this attempt, and subsequently granted a di-
rected verdict for the defendant on the basis that the medical prob-
lem involved was so complex that expert testimony was required.!
The court of appeals affirmed the ruling, holding that a defendant
under cross-examination had to testify only as to facts within his own
personal knowledge. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding
that "in a malpractice action, expert testimony may be elicited from
a physician defendant called by plaintiff, 'as if under cross-examina-
tion,' pursuant to Section 2317.07, Revised Code." 10
Although the question involved in the Oleksiw case has not
previously been before the Ohio Supreme Court," the Ninth District
Court of Appeals had previously held that in malpractice actions a
plaintiff could not require expert testimony of the defendant-physi-
cian called for cross-examination.' Thus, the Oleksiw case marks a
significant departure from prior rules of evidence in Ohio.
The majority of the older decisions in other jurisdictions, while
recognizing the right of a plaintiff to examine a defendant-physician
in a malpractice suit, generally held that such examination was
52 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965).
6 A bilateral femoral arteriogram is a form of x-ray taken of the femoral artery in
the thigh by first injecting a fluid into the artery.
7 See note 3 supra.
8 Oleksiw v. Weidener, No. 715656, Ohio C.P., Cuyahoga County, May 8, 1963.
9 Oleksiw v. Weidener, 195 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
10 Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 150, 207 N.E.2d 375, 378 (1965).
1 Id. at 149, 207 N.B.2d at 377.
12 F orthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 442, 21 NXB.2d 869, 872 (1938). This
case held that the trial court committed no error in refusing to permit examination by
the plaintiff of the defendant-physician in a malpractice case as an expert under OHIO
REv. CODE § 2317.07. The court said that the plaintiff could not establish the standard
of care, skill, and diligence by which the defendant's conduct was to be judged through
cross-examination of the defendant. The Forthofer case was followed in Wiley v. Whar-
ton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941).
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limited to facts within the physician's knowledge.1" The physician
could be questioned as to what he actually saw and did, but could
not be asked whether his actions deviated from the accepted medical
practice in the community since this would require expert opinion.
Generally, the reason advanced for denying questions requiring ex-
pert testimony was that adverse-witness statutes were never intended
for such use.'4 In the earliest case of significance advancing this
"restrictive" view of adverse-witness statutes,' 5 the Supreme Court
of Idaho stated that the purpose of its adverse-witness statute was to
permit a party to the action to call the adverse party and examine
him regarding some pertinent fact in the controversy, but not to per-
mit the plaintiff to establish his cause of action through the expert
opinion of the defendant-physician. Cross-examination rules were
applied on the basis that the adverse party was likely to be hostile
and evasive; therefore, leading questions and impeachment were to
be permitted. In addition to subscribing to the theory that questions
requiring expert testimony were not within the purview of adverse-
witness statutes, proponents of Osborn v. Carey'6 felt that such ques-
tions would give plaintiff an unfair advantage, since under the guise
of cross-examination a plaintiff could accept favorable testimony and
refute or impeach the defendant as to any unfavorable testimony
offered.' 7 Approximately half of the jurisdictions with adverse-
witness statutes have adopted this "restrictive" view. 8
In the subject case, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the above
13 See, e.g., Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967 (1913); Hull v. Plume,
131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389,
237 N.W. 915 (1931).
14 Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963). This is the latest
case to adopt the restrictive view. The court stated: "Undoubtedly the trial court felt,
and properly so, that cross-examination under the rules was not designed to force a
defendant into becoming a plaintiff's expert witness, particularly when the plaintiff is
attempting to condemn the expertise of that witness." Id. at 406-07, 123 N.W.2d at
691.
15 Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967 (1913).
16 Ibid.
17 "In our opinion section 7870, supra, was never intended to permit a party to an
action to call an adverse party as an expert, examine him as such under the rules of
cross-examination, and yet not be bound by the testimony." Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61
N.D. 389, 409, 237 N.W. 915, 922 (1931). The court then cited Osborn v. Carey,
24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967 (1913). Section 7870 referred to in the above quote was
North Dakota's adverse-witness statute, N.D. COMP. LAws 5 7870 (1913).
18 See Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963). The court
felt that this was the general rule, thus implying that more than half the jurisdictions
follow the restrictive view. According to the subject case, Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio
St. 2d 147, 149, 207 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1965), the other jurisdictions which have con-
sidered the question are about evenly divided.
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view and adopted the "liberal" view advanced in a number of more
recent cases.'9 These cases have held that an adverse-witness statute
does not restrict the scope of examination merely to facts within
the knowledge of the adverse party, but that expert opinion, if the
party is qualified to so testify, may also be elicited.20 The 1944 case
of Lawless v. Calaway" was the first significant case advancing this
more liberal view. The California Supreme Court stated that
"neither the letter nor the spirit of the statute suggests any reason
why the defendant in such an action [a malpractice action] should
not be examined with regard to the standard of skill and care ordi-
narily exercised by doctors in the community under like circum-
stances and with respect to whether his conduct conformed thereto."2
19 See, e.g., Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944); Libby v. Con-
way, 192 Cal. App. 2d 865, 13 Cal. Rep. 830 (1961); State v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156,
167 A.2d 117 (1961); McDermott v. Manhattan Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d
469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964).
2 0 See, e.g., McDermott v. Manhattan Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964). The court stated that "a plaintiff in a malpractice action is en-
titled to call the defendant doctor to the stand and question him both as to his factual
knowledge of the case (that is, as to his examination, diagnosis, treatment and the like)
and, if he be so qualified, as an expert for the purpose of establishing the generally
accepted medical practice in the community." Id. at 29-30, 203 N.E.2d at 475, 255
N.Y.S.2d at 73.
2124 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944).
22 Id. at 90-91, 147 P.2d at 609. With reference to California's adverse-witness
statute, CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 2055, the court stated: "Statutes such as Section 2055
were enacted to enable a party to call his adversary and elicit his testimony without
making him his own witness.. They are remedial in character and should be liberally
construed in order to accomplish their purpose." Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81,
90, 147 P.2d 604, 608 (1944).
This holding has been quite persuasive, for it has been followed by a number of ju-
risdictions adopting the same reasoning, e.g., New York, Maryland, Ohio. The Mary-
land Supreme Court stated: "We think the reasoning of the Lawless case is persuasive."
State v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 161, 167 A.2d 117, 119 (1961). New York was the
last state to adopt the reasoning of the Lawless case prior to Ohio. In McDermott v.
Manhattan Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964), the New
York Court of Appeals in a case of first impression had to decide whether a question
requiring expert testimony could be elicited from a defendant-physician called by plain-
tiff. The question was answered in the affirmative in a rather extensive opinion which
apparently had a significant influence on the Ohio Supreme Court in the subject case.
The opinion contained the following reasoning:
[B]y allowing the plaintiff to examine the defendant doctor with regard
to the standard of skill and care ordinarily exercised by physicians in the com-
munity ... the courts do no more than conform to the obvious purpose un-
derlying the adverse-party-witness rule. That purpose, of course, 'is to permit
the production in each case of all pertinent and relevant evidence that is avail-
able from the parties to the action.' . . . The issue whether the defendant
doctor deviated from the proper and approved practice customarily adopted
by physicians practicing in the community is assuredly 'pertinent and relevant'
to a malpractice action. Indeed, absent such proof, the plaintiff's case would
have to be dismissed. Moreover, evidence on this issue is, in most instances
1965]
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The primary reason advanced in support of the liberal view is
that the obvious purpose of adverse-witness statutes is to permit the
production of all facts necessary to render a just decision.2" There-
fore, any relevant evidence should be made available to the parties,
including evidence in the possession of the adverse party.24 One of
the major criticisms of the older, restrictive view is that such view
depends solely upon a question of fairness. The court in Oleksiw,
referring to the restrictive view, stated that "the real basis seems to
be that it would not be fair or sporting to allow the plaintiff to force
the defendant to become his expert."2 5  Thus, the Ohio Supreme
Court made the claim that no question of "fairness" should be in-
volved in the matter.2
A closer analysis of the subject case raises some question as to
the real basis for the modern or liberal view. In general, the more
recent cases27 have two factors in common. First, in each case the
alleged medical negligence was beyond the comprehension of a lay-
man, thus requiring expert testimony. Second, in each case the
plaintiff called no other expert witnesses to testify in his behalf.
Therefore, in each case the court's refusal to permit the eliciting of
expert testimony from the defendant-physician would have necessi-
tated the granting of a directed verdict for defendant; without ex-
'available' from the defendant doctor. Id. at 27-28, 203 N.E.2d at 473-74,
255 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
The court then discussed the difficulty plaintiffs encounter in attempting to obtain
expert witnesses. It stated:
In consequence, the plaintiffs only recourse in many cases may be to ques-
tion the defendant doctor as an expert in the hope that he will thereby be able
to establish his malpractice claim.
There is nothing unfair about such a practice. Unlike his counterpart in
a criminal prosecution, the defendant in a civil suit has no inherent right to
remain silent or, once on the stand, to answer only those inquiries which will
have no adverse effect on his case. Id. at 28, 203 N.E.2d at 474, 255 N.Y.S.2d
at 72.
In Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 150, 207 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1965), the
Ohio Supreme Court cited the McDermott case twice, once quoting from it.
23 See, e.g., McDermott v. Manhattan Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964); Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375
(1965).
24 
"If the defendant in a malpractice action may truthfully testify that his conduct
conformed to the standard required, his case is, of course, substantially strengthened
and, if he cannot so testify, the plaintiffs chances of recovery are unquestionably in-
creased. In either case, the objective of the court in doing justice is achieved." Olek-
siw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 150, 207 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1965), quoting from
McDermott v. Manhattan Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 28, 203 N.E.2d 469, 474, 255 N.Y.S.2d
65,72 (1964).
25 Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 149, 207 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1965).
26 Ibid.
27 See cases cited note 19 supra.
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pert testimony, the issue of negligence could not have been presented
to the jury.2" The courts seem reluctant to grant a directed verdict,
possibly feeling that it is the refusal of doctors to condemn the prac-
tices of their colleagues in open court that is largely responsible for
the plaintiff's lack of expert witnesses.20 Thus, it may be stated that
the courts feel it would be "unfair" to grant a directed verdict for
the defendant in a malpractice suit simply because of the common
bond of silence existing among medical practitioners. Therefore, al-
though the courts which permit questions requiring the expert testi-
mony of a defendant-physician claim to be basing their determina-
tion on what they consider to be the real purpose of adverse-witness
statutes, they are in fact doing no more than basing their determina-
tion upon concepts of "fairness." Yet, the major criticism of the
restrictive view was that it was based upon "fairness." As previously
indicated, the Ohio Supreme Court held that fairness should not
be considered a determining factor."0 Proponents of the modern
view seem to be guided by the very theory which they claim to be
rejecting.
A question may well arise with respect to what the Ohio courts
will now do where a plaintiff in a malpractice suit not only attempts
to elicit expert opinion from a defendant-physician, but also calls
other expert witnesses. These facts came before a New York court
in Forman v. Azzura8' five months after the New York Court of
Appeals had adopted the more liberal view in McDermott v. Man-
hattan Hosp.82 In the Forman case, plaintiff's counsel requested
permission to read into evidence answers made by the defendant-
physician to questions requiring expert testimony. The answers had
been given during a pre-trial examination. The Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling ex-
cluding the questions and answers. It stated that where a plaintiff's
proof does, in fact, include the opinions of other experts, no error is
committed by excluding the expert opinion of the defendant-physi-
28 See note 2 supra.
29 The courts are undoubtedly justified in this belief. See note 1 supra. In Mc-
Dermott v. Manhattan Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964),
the court said: "It is not always a simple matter to have one expert, a doctor in this
case, condemn in open court the practice of another, particularly if the latter is a leader
in his field." Id. at 27, 203 N.E.2d at 474, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
30 Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 149, 207 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1965).
8123 App. Div. 2d 793, 259 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1965).
32 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964).
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